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1 
Introduction 
When and how do terrorist groups attract high levels of civilian support? 
When discussing support for terrorism, scholars have usually identified and 
analyzed active support in the form of material and financial aid in the form 
of the following sources–communities (population), states, diaspora, charities 
and aid from non-governmental organizations; organized criminal groups, 
and other insurgent and terrorist groups. Yet others have explored behavioral 
and attitudinal support, which can be both active and passive, to assess rebel 
group’s military success.1 Literature that specifically focus on understanding 
certain aspects of civilian support for terrorism discuss levels of violence used 
against civilian and availability of resources.2 Some others analyze the 
relevance of religion and support for terrorism3. Yet others have studied 
whether anti-Americanism is the major cause of popular support for 
terrorism.4 Another set of scholarship analyzing the relationship between 
                                                          
1 Levitt, Matthew, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony 
given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, 
D.C. 25 (2005); Brynjar, Lia, and Katja Skjølberg, “Why terrorism occurs: a survey of 
theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism,” Oslo, FFI/RAPPORT-
2000/02769 (2000): 17; Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, 
and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand Corporation, 2001); Mascini, Peter, “Can the Violent Jihad Do Without 
Sympathizers?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:4 (2006): 343-357; Smith, Paul J. 
“Climate change, weak states and the War on Terrorism in South and Southeast 
Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 29:2 (2007): 264-285; Millen, Raymond A., and Steven Metz, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in the 21st century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, (Diane 
Publishing, 2004); Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? 
Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 21:2 (2009): 306-326. 
2 Rebels might include a host of actors including terrorists, guerilla fighters, insurgents, 
secessionists etc. Since their behavior towards generating fear using violence is common 
and overlapping, I include an analysis of rebel-civilian interaction in general, to 
understand terrorist behavior. Weinstein, Jeremy, Inside Rebellion (New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2007). This study focuses on understanding rebel behavior. 
Though his analysis does not particularly mention terrorists, the behavior as emulated by 
the rebels in his study is applicable to various terrorist groups’ behavior, especially left 
wing extremists. For this reason, I include his analysis on rebel behavior and resource 
endowment in my discussion of terrorist-civilian interactions. 
3 Fair, C. Christine, and Bryan Shepherd. “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from 
Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Coastal Management 29:1 (2006): 51-74; De Mesquita, 
Ethan Bueno, Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). 
4 Tessler, Mark, and Michael DH Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and 
Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51:2 (2007): 305-328. These authors investigate the anti-American sentiment 
in the Arab world, particularly Algeria and Jordan to understand whether religion and 
culture, or political and economic considerations are the determinants of support for 
terrorism following this anti-Americanism. 
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2 
terrorist groups and civilian support have considered inter-group 
competition, economic resource maximization, active and passive coercion, 
and resource provision by the terrorist group.5 Bloom investigates why 
Palestinian public opinion increasingly supported radical Islamist 
organizations and their method of suicide bombings. One of the causes as 
identified by Bloom is inter-group competition.6 Her argument closely follows 
that of Kydd and Walter, who state that groups engaged in outbidding use 
violence to convince the public that terrorists have greater resolve than the 
other rivals do.7 The competition between Hamas and Fatah is a classic 
example of this behavior. 
 
Other studies investigating the link between civilian support and terrorism 
point out that terrorist groups’ ability to provide public goods increase public 
support for these groups.8 However, not all civilians receive equal incentives. 
As Weinstein points out, some civilians get favorable treatment, but others do 
not, mainly because of the existing resources.9 While these authors emphasize 
the role of competition and resources to discuss rebel-civilian and terrorist-
civilian interactions, others show the importance of ideology and 
organizational structure. These variables are no doubt important. However, a 
crucial element that is missing is the discussion about support for terrorism 
the relevance of territory. Territorial access by terrorist groups, in addition to 
organizational strength, ideology, financial support, competition, or 
partnership with other groups, is an important element in determining how 
frequently terrorists interact with civilians. My key theoretical interest is in 
the combined effect of terrorist group’s territorial control, ideology, ethnicity, 
political competitiveness, and target selection on civilian support. While 
previous studies have considered some of these categories, none has 
                                                          
5 Bloom, Mia, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and 
Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly 119:1 (2004): 61-88; Byman, Daniel, 
“Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31:2 (2008): 165-
200; Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing 
the Club Model,” Journal of Public Economics 92:10 (2008): 1942-1967; Lilja, Jannie, 
“Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain 
Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” 306-326. 
6 Bloom, Mia, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and 
Outbidding,” 61-88. 
7 Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist 
Violence,” International Organization 56:2 (2002): 263-296. 
8 Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the 
Club Model,”1942-1956; Berman, Eli, Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An 
Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias. No. w10004. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2003; Simon, Steven, and Jeff Martini. “Terrorism: Denying al 
Qaeda its Popular Support,” Washington Quarterly 28:1 (2004): 129-145. 
9 Weinstein, J. M., Inside Rebellion (Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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3 
emphasized the role of territory in determining levels of civilian support. This 
article addresses this gap and builds on the existing scholarship of civilian-
terrorist interaction. 
 
Territory can feature in two ways in terrorism–as a goal, and/or actual 
control of territory. Kydd and Walter identify territorial change as one of the 
important goals of terrorism.10 Territorial change means taking territory away 
from the state with the purpose of establishing a new state. In Sri Lanka, the 
Tamil Tigers fought mainly for separate Tamil territory. Another purpose of 
taking territory away from the state can include joining another state. Lashkar 
-e-Taiba is fighting for Kashmir region in India, to become a part of 
Pakistan.11 Territorial control is not a straightforward concept, because 
sometimes terrorist groups deliberately do not seize territory to maintain 
their clandestine nature.12 These terrorist organizations with no territorial 
control are classified as underground organizations.13 The Red Army Faction 
in Germany was fully clandestine and operated in cities only. Merrari uses the 
criterion of territorial control to distinguish between terrorism and guerilla 
warfare.14 However, many groups use terrorism and guerilla warfare 
interchangeably. These hybrid groups can and often does have access to 
territory, and it is worth exploring how access to territory can determine the 
levels of civilian support received by the terrorist group.15 
 
Assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism is a timely and relevant topic. 
This is a challenging but relevant topic because as conflict progresses over 
time, people increasingly become dependent on rebels for their livelihoods, 
physical security, and this leads to their further cooperation with the rebels.16 
For example, territorial control gave LTTE new opportunities to extract 
                                                          
10 Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International 
Security 31:1 (2006): 49-80. 
11 Ibid. 
12 De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without a Territory An Analysis 
of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56:4 
(2012): 580-603. 
13 Della Porta, Donatella, “Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: 
Italian left-wing terrorism,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-69. 
14 Merari, Ariel, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 5:4 (1993): 213-251. 
15 Since terrorists and insurgents share some common elements like method of violence 
used, motivation for using violence, this overlap is difficult to ignore. Most of the terrorist 
groups borrow heavily from insurgent tactics and vice-versa. In this paper, this point is 
taken into consideration to understand the terrorist group behavior. 
16 Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-326. 
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4 
constituent support.17 The comparison of civilian support for terrorist groups 
shows ‘how’ differently terrorist groups behave with the constituent 
population that they seek to represent. For instance, the degree of public 
support seems to have a strong influence on the strategic use of violence by 
groups.18 A full understanding of terrorism needs to look beyond counting 
incidents and consider its severity, differences in strategies, constraints, range 
of actions, organizational dynamics, and relevance of host populace and 
competition from other groups.19 Faria and Arce point out that strategic 
analyses of terrorism are broadly divided into two types–one studies the 
consequences of counter-terrorism policies, the other set of scholarship looks 
at rationality of decisions made by individual terrorists. Faria and Arce 
introduce the relevance of a third line of enquiry–recruitment of human 
resources for terrorist activity.20 Comparing levels of civilian support can 
show how people are directly and indirectly associated with terrorist groups.  
 
Analysis of civilian support is also pertinent for counter-terrorism. Various 
terrorist groups manipulate public opinion in many ways.21 Often the 
terrorists use violence in such a way as to provoke counter-terrorism 
responses that result in backlash against the government by constituent 
population.22 Public support thus becomes an important element for 
competing against the government. In Nepal, state responses to Maoist 
conflict were so repressive that national and international audiences criticized 
it. The Nepalese state violated human rights. This worked in favor of the 
Maoist group who gained considerable popular support following this. It is 
important for governments to assess the levels of support to plan specific 
responses, often combining military and non-military methods. 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid. The author mentions about territorial entrapment to explain how rebels treat 
civilian population over time. She explains that with acquisition of territory, LTTE 
territorially entrapped people by restricting movement of people to leave these areas. The 
LTTE did this to prevent information leaks and increase recruitment (p. 315) 
18 Clauset, A., L. Heger, M. Young, and K. S. Gleditsch, “The Strategic Calculus of 
Terrorism: Substitution and Competition in the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” Cooperation 
and Conflict 45:1 (2010): 6-33. 
19 Ibid. 
20Faria, J. R. and D. G. Arce, “Terror Support and Recruitment,” Defence and Peace 
Economics 16:4 (2005): 263-273; Pape, Robert A, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97:3 (2003): 343-361. 
21 Bueno de Mesquita, E., “Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim 
World,” United States Institute of Peace, Working Paper, No.1. (2007). 
22 Bueno de Mesquita, E. and E. S. Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, 
Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51:2 (2007): 
364-381, and De Figueiredo, R. and B. R. Weingast, “Vicious Cycles; Endogenous Political 
Extremism and Political Violence,” Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper 
2001-9 (2001), University of California, Berkeley. 
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5 
This article is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss why terrorist 
group’s access to territory along with other variables like terrorist group’s 
political involvement, organizational strength, ties to other groups, target 
selection, and ethnic composition of the area they operate from are important 
for assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism. The second section 
discusses the concepts, data, and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a 
method and how this study used QCA. The third section analyzes the 
empirical evidence and the concluding section mentions the key findings, the 
relevance of the combined effects of territory, ideology, and organization in 
determining the levels of civilian support and avenues for future research. 
 
Terrorist-civilian Interaction: Determining levels of support for 
terrorism 
This article proceeds from the premise that both terrorists and civilians are 
rational actors. However, rational behavior is usually influenced by socio- 
political and economic institutional arrangements underlying the societies 
where violence is taking place.23 Therefore, it is important to analyze the 
socio-political resource environment in which the terrorist groups operate to 
learn how this environment can explain terrorist-civilian interaction and 
varying levels of civilian support for terrorist groups. 
 
In terrorist-civilian interaction there are two sets of rational action–one from 
the point of view of the terrorist group and other from the point of view of 
civilian population. From the terrorist group’s standpoint, the rational 
decision to include or exclude civilian support is dependent on a set pre-
existing, dynamic and acquired conditions. Together, these conditions help 
build a resource environment for the terrorist groups. These conditions 
indirectly affect the civilian’s decision making as well. Based on their 
perception of these conditions the civilians decide whether to support 
terrorist groups. These conditions are therefore bi-directionally perceived by 
a) directly by the terrorists and b) indirectly by the civilians. Since the 
terrorist group is the main actor, the above-mentioned conditions are directly 
relevant for their decision-making, and the civilians are secondary actors.24 In 
this article, the focus is solely on terrorist-civilian interaction and deliberately 
exclude the discussion on state actors in assessing civilian support, because 
                                                          
23 Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, “The political 
economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism,” Public Choice 128:1-2 
(2006): 289-315. 
24 Terrorists are the main actors because they are initiators of violence and threats. In 
many instances, if not all, terrorists act first, thereby beginning a chain of events. 
Bhattacharya: Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism
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6 
type of state and actions of the state (repressive, negligent, tolerant) 
constitutes a different topic of discussion in relation to support for terrorism. 
What is important is how civilians perceive terrorist group irrespective of the 
role of the state, nature, and type of the state (democratic or authoritarian). In 
addition, in some cases, states are involved in providing some support for 
violence. By analyzing causal conditions like terrorist’s ideological motivation, 
target selection, and political involvement, there is some indirect reference to 
state function. 
 
While it is not possible to include all the aspects of the pre-existing, dynamic 
and acquired conditions that determine terrorist-civilian interaction, the 
following are relevant - terrorist group’s ideological motivation; territorial 
access; target selection; political involvement; sub-group affiliation and the 
levels of ethnic fractionalization in the area of terrorist control. Scholars have 
studied one or more of these to learn about how terrorist groups survive, how 
lethal they are and their organizational strength However, they are treated as 
individual categories and few studies have analyzed the combined effects of 
two or more of these conditions to analyze levels of civilian support. This 
article highlights how these categories create the pre-existing, dynamic, and 
acquired conditions that. Figure 1 explains the relevance of these conditions. 
  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 2
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7 
 
Figure 1. Resource environment of terrorist group - pre-existing, 
dynamic and acquired conditions 
 
 
Source: Based on the theoretical discussion above, the author created this 
table. 
 
Pre-existing conditions are those that are already present when the terrorist 
group begins to function, for instance ethnic composition of the area 
ideological motivation (this can be religious or nationalist ideology) and 
targets (national or international government/civilians). Dynamic conditions 
are those that change over time. These conditions can include terrorist 
group’s political participation over the course of time; various terrorist groups 
began to operate as political parties and vice versa. Motivation and target 
selection can fall under this category if they change. Acquired conditions are 
those that the terrorist group gradually comes into possession, as is the 
number of affiliations the group has. While there can be overlap between the 
dynamic and acquired conditions, one distinction is that acquired conditions 
might not change over time. These three types of conditions build the 
resource environment for the terrorist group.  
 
Bhattacharya: Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
 
 
 
8 
Territorial control, for instance, provides the terrorist groups with safe-haven 
or sanctuary where they can hide their weapons, train without being caught 
and maintain communications with local civilians to gain relevant 
information. Furthermore, this territorial control provides the terrorist group 
with power to exercise coercion with local population.25 This location can be 
strategically used to maintain ties with other affiliate organizations. 
Sanctuaries are spaces safe from harassment and surveillance and it fosters 
oppositional culture and group solidarity.26 It can work as spatial ‘preserves’ 
not necessarily in the geographical sense but as ‘free’ social spaces, where 
members of subordinate groups discover their common problems and discuss 
ways to overcome these. These spaces can be located within clubs, 
associations, even within families of nationalist militants.27 To create these 
social spaces, the terrorist groups have access to certain locations, which later 
constitute part of the territorial control. These can be created nationally and 
internationally. My focus is on national or domestic territorial control and 
once territory is acquired formally or informally, it affects the functioning of 
the group and it will always vie for territorial control, thereby making it more 
of an acquired condition than dynamic.  
 
Holding territory implies some measure of power and control over local 
residents.28 To maintain this territory, the groups need social, political, and 
economic resources. Therefore, terrorist group’s domestic territorial control 
(national sanctuary) is a key determinant of the levels of civilian support that 
the group receives. ‘Where’ and ‘how’ terrorist groups operate has direct 
implication on how these groups are perceived by civilians. Territorial control 
gains further relevance when certain conditions are present or absent. It is 
important to discuss how it is associated with other preexisting, dynamic, and 
acquired conditions like ideological motivation, target selection, political 
                                                          
25 Coercion is often a preferred tactic used by terrorists to gain information and some 
level of support. While it is an important element, it is not the only method used. In this 
paper, the theoretical focus is why we see civilian support for terrorist groups, and not 
how they are forced to support terrorism. It is one way of understanding support. By 
expanding the analysis of civilian support, this paper shows when there is support even in 
the absence of coercion. 
26 Fantasia, Rick, and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in rebellion: The appropriation and 
transformation of the veil in the Algerian revolution,” in eds. H. Johnston and B. 
Klandermans, Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press 1995): 144-59; Haussler, Nicholas., I., J. Russel, and A. M. Baylouny, Third 
Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency (Monterey, California: Naval 
Postgraduate School, Thesis 2005). 
27 Johnston, Hank, Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1979 (NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1991). 
28 De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels Without a Territory: An 
Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” 580-603. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 2
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9 
involvement, sub-group affiliation, and levels of ethnic fractionalization in the 
area of control, in determining levels of civilian support for terrorism. 
 
Concepts, Data and Method 
In this article, a terrorist group is defined as: 
 
A group of non-state actors (sub-national/clandestine) having 
national and/or transnational territorial base, but is not 
formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of 
violence or threat of violence that they use strategically with a 
political purpose, directed against representatives of a formally 
recognized state actor in the international system (domestic or 
transnational) and/or civilians with the aim of influencing 
several audiences.29 
 
This definition of a terrorist group, offers both general and contextual 
understanding of the term. To do this, Gerring’s method is used. The method 
has three components––the term, the phenomena to be defined and the 
properties or attributes that define it.30 To define the term contextually, the 
attributes of terrorist group (following its definition) are included and the 
function of these attributes is further elaborated to determine how some of 
                                                          
29 Definition of terrorism is drawn from existing scholarship, particularly, “Politically 
motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of 
publicity plays a significant role,” in Weinberg, L., A. Pedahzur, and S. Hirsch-Hoefler, 
“The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16:4 
(2004): 777-794. 
“Modern terrorism refers to a type of violent interaction initiated by a non-state actor 
which is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or a 
valid initiation of violent interactions directed against representatives (human, material 
or symbolic) of a formally recognized state actor in the international system which does 
not follow the institutionalized rules and convention of military engagement,” see 
Lizardo, O, “Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered 
Approach,” Journal of World-Systems Research 14 (2008): 91-118. 
Another much used definition of terrorism put forth by American Law (Title 22 of the US 
Code, Section 265 f(d)) defines it as: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience…” And Goodwin (2006) defines it as “The 
strategic use of violence and threats of violence usually intended to influence several 
audiences by oppositional political groups against civilians or non-combatants who 
belong to specific ethnicity, religion or national group, social class or some other 
collectivity without regard to their individual identities or role.” See Goodwin, J., “A 
Theory of Categorical Terrorism,” Social Forces 84:4 (2006): 2027-2046. 
30 Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 39. 
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10 
these are linked with civilian support31. Table 1 presents the general and 
specific attributes and the functions of these attributes. In particular, focus on 
the techniques, targets, actors, and goals to conceptualize the terrorist group. 
 
Table 1. Attributes of a Terrorist Group and Functions of these 
Attributes 
Concept Attributes Functions of 
the attributes 
How functions are 
related 
 
 
Collective of 
people using 
violence (non-
state actors) 
Interaction 
between groups 
of people defined 
by violence and 
fear 
 
The functions define 
how the terrorist group 
interacts with their 
audiences, especially 
civilians 
 
Terrorist 
Group 
Territorial or 
transnational 
base 
Control over 
territory and 
sections of 
population 
 
This interaction is 
governed by fear, 
punishment, common 
grievances, control and 
coercion  
 
 Targets civilians 
and 
governments 
 
Motives, goals 
and action 
 
 
 Not formally 
recognized as a 
legitimate 
wielder of the 
means of 
violence or 
threat of 
violence 
Justification for 
the use of 
violence is absent 
 
 
Source: Table created by author. 
 
This study analyzes fifteen terrorist groups in this study. The selected cases 
illustrate the outcome of interest positively, meaning that for these positive 
cases the outcome of interest (high civilian support) is occurring. For 
example, some of the cases (terrorist groups) show high levels of civilian 
support (outcome of interest), while other cases do not necessarily show the 
                                                          
31 Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology, 70. At the general level, as suggested by 
Gerring a definition is not concerned with empirical matters but rather looks at ‘formal’ 
criteria of the term. To determine the ‘formal’ criteria, I use three steps–sampling usages 
(existing definitions), typologizing attributes and construction of minimal and ideal 
typical definition. For details about definitions please see Weinberg et al (2004); Lizardo 
(2008); American Law (Title 22 of the US Code, Section 265 f(d)); Goodwin (2006). 
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11 
occurrence of the outcome (i.e. they do not have high levels of civilian support 
and in this sense, they are negative cases). Together the set of positive and 
negative cases constitute the relevant set of cases for the analysis. 
Furthermore, the fifteen groups included here are some of the most important 
terrorist groups because of their prolonged survival. In existing terrorism 
literature, there is an over emphasis on studying Islamic fundamentalist 
organizations. Therefore, in addition to Islamic fundamentalist organizations, 
I include left extremist groups, with a focus on Maoist groups, active in South 
Asia. Highlighting both right and left extremist groups provides detailed 
insights about how differences in ideological motivation affect civilian 
support for terrorist groups. Cases are selected from both developing and 
developed regions and different political regimes to include regional diversity.  
 
The outcome variable is civilian support. This constitutes an important aspect 
of strategic communication and can function at two levels––ideological or 
attitudinal (passive) and/or behavioral (direct or active). The focus here is on 
ideological support. Behavioral and attitudinal support is difficult to 
demarcate. Lilja points out that both attitudinal and behavioral support are 
necessary for the rebel groups to succeed militarily.32 Lilja uses the term 
behavioral support as an ‘act’ of providing support.33 This can range from 
passive to neutral co-operation or silence, offering food. Shelter, finances, and 
information to active provision of armed and non-armed services. In existing 
terrorism literature, there is no concrete definition of civilian support. Khalil, 
Paul, and Lilja distinguish between attitudinal and behavioral support to 
identify the function of support.34 Table 2 elaborates this distinction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Lilja, Jannie. “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Khalil, James. “Insurgent–Populace Relations in Nepal: An Analysis of Attitudinal and 
Behavioural Support,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23:2 (2012): 221-244; Paul, 
Christopher, “How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support?” Social Science for 
Counterterrorism 74:6-C (2009): 113; see also: Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or 
Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328. 
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Table 2. Common Elements in Conceptualizing Support for 
Terrorism 
Paul 2009, Lilja 2009 and 
Khalil (2012)-
conceptualizing support for 
terrorism and armed 
groups 
Related actions 
1. Finances 
 
 
               ‘act’ of supporting 
2. Shelter, information/ safe 
house, armed forces 
 
 
3. Passive consent, not 
reporting events, passive 
neutral co-operation, non-
armed services 
Expressed support, 
sympathizing for the cause, not 
protesting or preventing it.  
Source: Paul (2009), Lilja (2009), and Khalil (2012). 
 
Passive consent is often a precursor to active support later. Active support for 
terrorism is often difficult to measure accurately. Although passive consent is 
also a challenging concept, public opinion surveys have tried to capture the 
attitudinal support for terrorism making it possible to measure, in some way, 
the levels, and causes of this type of support. Following the discussion on 
attitudinal and behavioral support, this article identifies common elements of 
conceptualizing civilian support as: 
 
Attitudinal and co-operative support by a section of the 
constituent population that is represented by the terrorist 
group, located in the terrorist group’s home country, where the 
terrorist group has some territorial control or base. 
 
Collating civilian support data for terrorism is challenging because few 
surveys are done to measure attitudinal support and it is difficult to 
conduct these surveys because of accessibility of data due to sensitivity 
of the topic. For this article, macro-level data, collected from existing 
public opinion surveys is combined with micro-level data collected 
through field research and archival document analysis.35 Appendix i. 
                                                          
35 The author used the following public opinion surveys–World Public Opinion Poll 
(2006), Times of India Poll (2010), Himal Media Public Opinion Poll (2003), 
Euskobarometer–Universidad del Pais Vaseo (2009), Gallup Poll (1998-2001), 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research–Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 
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lists the data sources and levels of civilian support for the fifteen 
terrorist groups under study here. 
 
The data indicates that civilian support for the fifteen groups ranges 
from 2 percent to 60 percent. What is challenging about measuring 
ideological support for terrorist groups is determining the correct 
quantitative value to estimate high or low levels. Even if a group has 5 
percent, popular support it is substantial for terrorist groups. What 
might represent a lower value, for instance 15 percent can actually be a 
high level of support for terrorist groups. For estimating low levels of 
civilian support, a low percentage level––2 percent to 15 percent is 
assigned to determine groups having low levels of civilian support. 
Groups that have 60 percent to 15 percent civilian support are 
considered as having high levels of civilian support.  
 
There are six causal conditions under study.36 The focus is to understand 
combination of conditions, thereby highlighting causal complexity. Territorial 
control depicts the regional area controlled by terrorist groups in their home 
country where they have active base (country of origin and where they 
conduct operation).37 The second causal condition is target selection, which is 
classified into four categories––a) purely national, b) mostly national with 
limited international targets, c) mostly international with limited national 
target and d) purely international. The third causal condition is ideological 
motivation. Based on data from Global Terrorism Database (GTD), groups are 
classified based on a) having purely religious motivation, b) predominantly 
religious in conjunction with nationalist separatist motivation, c) 
predominantly nationalist/separatist with low religious motivation and d) 
purely nationalist/separatist motivation or purely non-religious motivation. 
The fourth causal condition is ethnic fractionalization. To analyze this 
condition, Fearon’s data is used to measure the level of ethnic composition in 
                                                          
46 (2012), Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2009-2010, 2012, SETA and Pollmark (2009), 
Public Opinion Poll, Lima 1991, and Harmon 1992. From each of the public opinion 
surveys, the author identified key questions that directly focus on measuring support for 
the respective terrorist group. Since the research relied on multiple data sources, the 
author identified common key questions in these surveys (mentioned in Appendix ii.). 
These questions contain direct and indirect inquiries about the particular group and/or 
its main leader, and the methods used by these groups. Several of these questions look at 
measuring public attitudes about the violence used by particular organizations. 
36 In qualitative comparative analysis, the independent variable is known as a causal 
condition. The dependent variable is known as an outcome variable. 
37 Territorial control does not always mean creating autonomous zones. It can be areas 
regularly frequented by terrorist groups, where they have informal bases with training 
camps. Within a particular region, there can be multiple locations of this sort. 
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the terrorist home country from where they gain civilian support.38 The 
number of sub-groups related to the terrorist groups measures the fifth causal 
condition, sub-group affiliation. To determine the number of allies, the GTD 
database is used. The sixth and final causal condition is political involvement. 
By this, I mean levels of active engagement by terrorist groups in electoral 
politics and/or levels of affiliation with political parties that contest for 
elections. To measure this, I rely on existing empirical studies on terrorist 
group profiles by Weinberg et al.39 Following this data, groups are classified 
as a) actively participates in electoral politics, b) not active in electoral politics 
but has support from other political party c) not active in electoral politics but 
has marginal support from other political party, and d) not active in electoral 
politics and no support from political parties. Appendices ii and iii, present 
the causal conditions is details. 
 
Fuzzy set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) is suitable for this 
analysis because it is relevant to assess the complex and conjectural 
(conditions are sufficient in combination) nature of the study. Furthermore, 
due to this connection between causality and complexity, QCA is naturally 
suited for cross-case diversity meaning that cases with similar levels of 
civilian support might not have the same causal mechanisms that generate it. 
Each causal path, no matter how many cases this path represents is relevant 
and potentially meaningful.40 What is most interesting about QCA is that it 
allows the researcher to have high level of familiarity with the data. QCA is an 
interactive and creative process.41 It allows for combining qualitative and 
quantitative data. The method of fs/QCA has several stages and is indeed 
labor intensive. However, it describes and analyzes data in a systematic 
format. At the same time, it does allow the researcher intuitive freedom to 
construct knowledge about each case. Additionally, it offers the researcher an 
ability to work with relatively smaller number of cases in comparison to 
purely large-N studies where number of cases must meet a minimum 
                                                          
38 Fearon, James D. “Ethnic and cultural diversity by country,” Journal of Economic 
Growth 8:2 (2003): 195-222. 
39 Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist 
Groups, Vol. 10. (New York, Routledge, 2008). 
40 Rihoux, Benoît, and Bojana Lobe, “The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): 
Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison,” The Sage handbook of case-based 
methods (2009): 222-242. 
41 Rihoux, Benoît, “Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic 
comparative methods recent advances and remaining challenges for social science 
research,” International Sociology 21:5 (2006): 679-706. 
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threshold. QCA can be applied to research designs involving small and 
intermediate size Ns (5-50).42 
 
Measuring Causal conditions: Fuzzy Membership Values 
To analyze the data using fs/QCA the next step is to calibrate the fuzzy 
membership scores of the six causal conditions. Based on the data as 
presented in the appendices, both direct and indirect method of calibration is 
used to assign fuzzy membership scores of these causal conditions for each 
case. A range of data (both qualitative and quantitative measures) is included. 
The calibration of the data was done using the fs/QCA software, using the 
command ‘compute’, followed by the function calibrate and identifying the 
variable and the three anchor points for each variable (outcome variable and 
causal conditions). Table 3  and 4 shows the process by which the initial 
values are determined. 
 
Table 3. Assigning Fuzzy Membership Scores to the Outcome Variable: 
Civilian Support 
Outcome 
variable 
Percentage Membership Anchor points 
 0%   Fully out  0 
Civilian support 15%  Threshold of 
inclusion/exclusion 
0.5 
 60% Fully in 1 
 
 
Table 4. Causal Conditions and Fuzzy Membership Scores 
Causal 
Conditions 
(VARIABLE 
NAME) 
Indicators membership  
Target selection 
(NATIONALTAR) 
90 percent events in home country 
45 percent events in home country 
 
20 percent events in home country 
Fully in 
Threshold of 
exclusion 
Fully out 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
(ETHFRAC) 
Ethnic fractionalization score  0.811 
Ethnic fractionalization  score 0.300 
 
Ethnic fractionalization  score 0.161 
Fully in 
Threshold of 
exclusion 
Fully out 
                                                          
42 Recent research shows that QCA is increasingly being used to study 100-1000 cases. 
The method can be applied to a vast range of cases. Fiss, Peer C., “Case studies and the 
configurational analysis of organizational phenomena,” Handbook of case study 
methods (2009): 424-440. 
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Causal 
Conditions 
(VARIABLE 
NAME) 
Indicators membership  
Organizational 
Affiliates 
(AFFILIATES) 
Link with 36 groups 
Link with 5 groups 
 
Link with  0 groups 
Fully in 
Threshold of 
exclusion 
Fully out 
Ideology 
(RELIDEOLOGY) 
Purely religious 
Mostly religious with nationalist/separatist 
Less religious and mostly 
nationalist/separatist 
Purely non-religious 
4 
3 
2 
1 
4=fully in  
2.5= 
threshold 
1=fully out 
 
Territorial 
control 
(TERCONTROL) 
Based only in home country 
Mostly based in home country, limited 
presence outside 
Loosely based in home country, 
considerable presence abroad 
No presence in home country, only located 
abroad 
4 
3 
2 
1 
 
4=fully in  
2.5= 
threshold 
1=fully out 
Political 
involvement 
(POLINVOLVE) 
Actively participates in electoral politics 
Not active in electoral politics but has 
support from other political party 
Not active in electoral but has marginal 
support from other political party 
Not active in electoral politics and no 
support from party 
4 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4=fully in  
2.5= 
threshold 
1=fully out 
 
Source: Created by author 
 
It further mentions the variable names for the six causal conditions. The 
values for these corresponding anchor points are mentioned in Table 5. The 
numerical values linked to three qualitative anchor points represent the 
criteria for inclusion or exclusion in a set (fully in, threshold of 
exclusion/inclusion, fully out). Following this, it generates a membership 
value based on a continuous scale ranging from 0.95 to 0.05.  
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Table 5. Fuzzy Membership Scores for the Outcome Variable and Causal 
Conditions 
GROUPNAM
E 
CIV_ 
SUPP 
AFFI
LIAT
ES 
ETH 
FRAC 
NAT_TA
R 
GET 
REL_IDE 
OLOGY 
TER_CO
N 
TROL 
POL 
INVOLV
E 
 
ABUSAYAAF 0.12 0.50 0.05 0.95 0.27 0.95 0.05 
ALQAEDA 0.14 0.95 0.93 0.19 0.95 0.27 0.05 
CPIMAO 0.95 0.62 0.95 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.27 
CPNMAO 0.60 0.52 0.90 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.95 
ETA 0.40 0.35 0.77 0.94 0.05 0.73 0.73 
FARC 0.07 0.52 0.89 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.73 
GIA 0.12 0.50 0.53 0.94 0.95 0.73 0.05 
HAMAS 0.95 0.62 0.79 0.55 0.27 0.95 0.95 
HEZBOL 0.92 0.57 0.94 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.95 
IRA 0.83 0.52 0.06 0.90 0.05 0.73 0.73 
LTTE 0.68 0.23 0.68 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.27 
LASHKART 0.61 0.60 0.80 0.05 0.73 0.73 0.05 
PKK 0.55 0.66 0.49 0.89 0.05 0.73 0.27 
SHNPATH 0.31 0.14 0.88 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 
TALIBAN 0.20 0.35 0.93 0.84 0.95 0.73 0.73 
Source: Created by author 
Empirical Results: Analysis of the Sufficient Conditions 
To determine the sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist 
groups, truth-table algorithm is used. This truth table lists all possible 
combinations and each configuration’s empirical outcome.43 The algorithm 
reveals combinations of causal conditions that are sufficient to explain the 
outcome. The meaningful patterns of necessity and sufficiency as generated 
by fs/QCA are based on the idea of subset relations between the combination 
of causal conditions and the outcome.44 The assessment of sufficient 
conditions involves examining the membership of all the terrorist groups in 
the set of those who have high levels of civilian support, with their 
membership in the sets of causal conditions, and this membership in the 
condition is greater than or equal to membership in the set of high civilian 
support. The proportion of cases for which this relationship holds true is 
known as ‘consistency’ and the ‘coverage’ score shows how many instances 
show this relationship.  
 
This analysis uses the complex solution to locate these combinations. In set-
theoretical logic, logical AND (*) refers to the intersection of sets and logical 
                                                          
43 Ragin, Charles C. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond, Vol. 240. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
44 Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann, “Standards of good practice in 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets,” Comparative Sociology 9:3 
(2010): 397-418. 
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OR (+) to the union of sets. In addition, the symbol ~, indicates the absence of 
a condition or NOT. The strongest membership of each case in any 
combination with a value of 1.00 is considered an ‘ideal’ case followed by 
consistency of 0.9 and 0.8. For my analysis, I look at cases that are marked by 
a consistency score of .85 and higher. Table 5 shows the consistency and 
coverage scores of the configurations. 
 
The first set of conditions in Table 6 shows that when a group has high 
number of affiliates or connections with other similar organizations in 
conjunction with territorial control and high levels of ethnic fragmentation, 
but not active political participation and international target (not national 
target), then it is sufficient for high levels of civilian support. The consistency 
for this combination is 0.92 but the coverage is low 0.20. The group that 
represents this combination is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). However, what is 
important here is the fact that the number of affiliates in addition to ethnic 
fragmentation and territorial control matters when the group’s ideology is 
more religious and partially leans towards nationalist/separatist. In addition, 
it matters when the group is not actively involved in local politics, and when 
the target is international. The predominant motive for LeT is securing 
Kashmir (now Indian Territory) to make it be part of Pakistan. The 
underlying motive is religious but their demand is territorial. Predominantly, 
the group wants to liberate the Islamic population residing in the Indian 
territory of Kashmir.  
 
Table 6. Sufficient Conditions for High Civilian Support for 
Terrorist Groups 
Analysis of sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups 
 
 High civilian support 
for terrorist groups 
Example groups 
 
Consistency    Coverage 
Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation 
AND 
~National target AND 
~Political involvement AND 
Religious ideology AND Territorial 
control 
 
0.92x                   0.20 Lashkar –e -Toiba 
(LeT) 
Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation 
AND 
National target AND Territorial 
control AND  
0.84y 0.44 CPN(M), 
Hezbollah, Hamas 
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Source: Created by author. 
 
The second set of conditions show that when the number of affiliates, ethnic 
fragmentation, territorial control, and national target selection along with 
active political participation combine then it is sufficient for high levels of 
civilian support. The consistency for this set is 0.84 and the coverage is 0.44. 
A consistency score of more than .70 is usually sufficient. This combination 
also reveals that ideology is not important when these conditions are present. 
The group’s ideology can be purely religious, purely nationalist, or purely 
political. What matters instead is the group’s active participation in local 
politics or active support from political groups. This element combines with 
the other factors to determine high levels of civilian support.  
 
The third set indicates a combination of the following causal conditions––
number of affiliates, national target, territorial control and political 
competition and not purely religious ideology. However, this set is like the 
previous set of conditions there are some important differences. Here, 
ideology matters when it is predominantly nationalist/separatist rather than 
only religious. In addition, ethnic fragmentation is absent from this set. This 
shift is due mainly to the fact that the group’s ideology is more nationalist or 
political. This is important in assessing group relation to ethnic composition 
of the region that they are representing. The consistency for this set is 0.88 
and the coverage is 0.44. The cases that fall under this set are CPN(M), IRA, 
and Hamas. Political participation and territorial control in addition to group 
affiliations remains a strong indicator in this set. 
 
Political involvement 
 
Affiliates AND National Target AND 
~ Religious ideology AND 
Territorial control AND Political 
involvement 
 
 
0.88x 
 
0.44 
 
CPI(Maoist), IRA 
and Hamas 
Ethnic fragmentation AND 
National target AND 
~ Religious ideology AND 
Territorial control AND Affiliates 
 
0.88x 0.47 CPI(M), Hamas and 
CPN(M) 
Total solution 
 
0.87 
 
0.68  
Notes: 
~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1 -membership score).  
Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually sufficient combination. Meets .85 
consistency benchmark for almost always sufficient condition. 
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The fourth set of conditions show that ethnic fragmentation and national 
target selection, in addition to territorial control, political competition, and 
nationalist/separatist ideology can lead to higher levels of civilian support for 
terrorist groups. It is important to note that nationalistic goals are more 
relevant along with the other factors to determine whether a group will have 
high levels of civilian support. In this set, the number of affiliates does not 
matter. The consistency score for this set in 0.88 and the coverage is .47. The 
groups that fall under this set are CPI(M), Hamas, and CPN(M). 
 
The four sets of combination of causal conditions consistently show that 
territorial control and number of affiliates is usually sufficient conditions that 
may lead to high civilian support. What stands out, however, is the fact the 
certain conditions matter only in the presence or absence of other 
condition/s. Political involvement matters only when ideological motivation is 
nationalist and or political. ETA in the Basque region can fall under this 
category. Furthermore, this finding can be applied to analyze left extremist 
terrorist organizations, some of which later transforms into legitimate 
political parties; CPN(M) in Nepal is an example. Religious ideology matters 
most in determining higher levels of civilian support when ethnic polarization 
is high. This can be applied to analyze the Islamic State (IS) since they operate 
in areas where the polarization between Shia and Sunni is high. Nationalist 
ideology matters more when the group is vying for political involvement. 
Additionally, political competition and national target selection in 
combination with other factors plays an important role in determining the 
levels of civilian support for particular terrorist groups.  
 
The role of territorial control is significant. It indicates that terrorist groups 
are keen to control significant geographical areas to construct a secure base. 
Once they do have a base, they begin to interact with civilian population 
frequently. To maintain the base, the groups also need civilian support. This 
becomes further relevant when the groups are active in local or national 
politics, or have active support from political groups. The case of the Maoist 
group in Nepal is an appropriate example. The Communist Party of Nepal, 
CPN(M) actively participated in the electoral politics. Immediately after the 
abolishment of monarchy and the ceasefire in 2006, the CPN(M) won the 
elections. This shows that they had active attitudinal support from the 
population. Moreover, this group had and still has significant territorial 
control and a clear aim of targeting the domestic government. The assessment 
of necessary conditions further emphasizes which conditions explain the 
occurrence of high civilian support.  
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Empirical Results: Analysis of the Necessary Conditions 
Table 7 presents the analysis of the necessary conditions for high levels of 
civilian support for terrorist groups. This analysis reveals four usually 
necessary conditions that can lead to high levels of civilian support for 
particular terrorist groups. Three of these conditions––high ethnic 
fragmentation, nationalist/separatist ideology and national target selection 
are a priori conditions. The causal condition, territorial control is an acquired 
condition. These conditions exceed the .85 benchmark for usually necessary 
condition. The analysis of necessary conditions reveals that the following 
conditions––territorial control, national target, not (~) religious ideology and 
ethnic fragmentation are both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
determining high levels of civilian support. 
 
Table 7. Necessary Conditions for Civilian Support for Terrorist 
Groups 
Source: Created by author. 
Analysis of necessary conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups 
 
 High civilian support   ~ High civilian support 
  
Consistency    Coverage Consistency     Coverage 
Territorial control 
~Territorial control 
0.96x 
0.28 
 0.59 
 0.72 
0.89x 
0.35 
0.56 
0.90 
 
Political involvement 
~Political involvement 
0.66 
0.56 
 
  0.72 
  0.51 
0.47 
0.74y 
0.52 
0.69 
Affiliates 
~Affiliates 
0.72y 
0.64 
  0.70 
  0.65 
0.66 
0.69 
0.65 
0.71 
 
Ethnic fragmentation 
~Ethnic fragmentation 
0.85x 
0.35 
  0.60 
  0.69 
0.82y 
0.44 
0.58 
0.75 
 
Religious ideology 
~Religious ideology 
0.34 
0.79y 
  0.49 
  0.60 
0.49 
0.64 
0.71 
0.50 
 
National target 
~National target 
0.85x 
0.29 
  0.54 
  0.68 
0.86x 
0.28 
0.55 
0.66 
 
     
Notes:  
~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1-membership score) 
x Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually necessary condition 
y Meets .85 consistency benchmark for almost always necessary condition 
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However, as presented in the right-hand column, two of these conditions–
territorial control and national target are also related to the absence of civilian 
support. Although this is paradoxical, this is largely due to the coding 
technique used here. These causal conditions do not have a value of zero and 
it is difficult to mark the presence or absence of these conditions by the score 
of zero. All the cases have some levels of territorial control and the number of 
events that occur nationally. Alternatively, the particularly interesting 
evidence that is emphasized here is that these conditions by themselves or 
singularly cannot explain the presence of high levels of civilian support. The 
conditions must combine in order to create the recipe for high levels of 
civilian support for particular terrorist organizations. As shown in the 
analysis of sufficient conditions, the most outstanding feature of the 
combinations is the presence of high territorial control in home country along 
with other conditions, particularly important being political competition and 
nationalist/separatist ideology. 
 
The two other causal conditions that are related to low civilian support are no 
political competition and when the groups have less number of affiliates or 
none at all. When terrorist groups are not active in electoral politics and are 
not part of any political organization, the likelihood of receiving popular 
support decreases. Part of this explanation is related to the fact that without 
political support, terrorist groups lose much of their constructed legitimacy. 
This directly influences people’s perception of these groups. Again, these 
groups for propagation as well as communication with civilians often use a 
political platform. The second factor is absence of affiliates. The conclusion 
that follows automatically from this is that the more affiliates that a terrorist 
group has, the more likely it is that these groups are communicating with 
more people. The possibility of reaching out to more people increases. All 
these findings are relevant for counterterrorism. 
 
The finding about political competition is highly relevant in analyzing the 
present transformation of FARC in Colombia. This left extremist group is 
undergoing a major shift in organizational structure, at present. FARC has a 
long history with phases where they operated as purely terrorist organization, 
narco-terrorist organization, and now, vying for legitimate political actor. 
This changing nature of operation influenced the levels of civilian support, 
which was high initially, but was low when narco-terrorism was their 
preferred mode of operation. In 2016, civilian support has changed yet again. 
In a recent referendum regarding the Colombian Peace deal between the 
government and the FARC, Colombians did reject the peace deal. However, 
the margin was narrow. Forty-nine point eight percent of the voters were in 
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favor of the peace deal, indirectly implying that they support FARC in their 
quest for legitimate political power. This is a significant change in levels of 
civilian support considering that it was low during ARC’s narco-terrorism 
phase. Political involvement, in this case, matters in determining levels of 
civilian support for organizations like FARC.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis in this article reveals key necessary and sufficient conditions that 
combine to explain why and how some terrorist groups have high civilian 
support while others do not. A variety of socio-political and geographical 
conditions combines to explain the context in which terrorist groups gain 
popular support. That some terrorist groups can gain high levels civilian 
support certain conditions combine is important for several reasons. First, it 
shows how terrorist groups despite their frequent use of violence, continue to 
proliferate and survive. Second, it shows key patterns of terrorist-civilian 
interactions. If terrorist organizations with a strong commitment to 
nationalist or political agenda hold territory and are well networked, the 
groups are more probable to attract civilian support. Civilians regularly assess 
the terrorist group’s commitment to the cause. Whether they ideologically 
support the group or not depends on this perception. Third, the findings 
indicate that contrary to popular belief that most people despise terrorism, 
there is considerable civilian support for it. This article looks at passive 
ideological support, which is often a precursor to active support. Fourth, it 
emphasizes the complexity of terrorism. Most studies analyze specific 
terrorist groups, types, and organizational mechanism or include event 
analysis. This study analyzes a different layer of indirect engagement, thereby 
urging counter-terrorism to look beyond military response. Fifth, it opens 
avenues for future research on the topic of support for terrorism.  
 
Possible areas of study include–analysis of levels of support for left extremist 
groups versus right extremist groups; distinction between rural and urban 
support base for terrorism and detailed analysis of types of violence used by 
terrorist organization and how it affects the levels of popular support. This 
study highlights six causal conditions. However, this list is not exclusive. 
Other possible conditions that can be relevant are state repression and types 
of violence used by terrorist groups. Furthermore, this analysis does not 
address the question of temporal variation in determining civilian support. 
For many terrorist groups, civilian support changes over time. While at the 
inception, a terrorist group can begin with high or low civilian support; this 
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can gradually change due to various factors. This might be another avenue of 
future research. 
 
The combination of conditions further reveal that those terrorist groups 
having active links with local/national politics with substantial control over 
territory will have different interactions with civilians than those that have 
territorial control but no active role in local politics. Along with this condition 
the demography of terrorist home country, particularly ethnic composition 
combine to explain that ethnic homogeneity does not always lead to higher 
levels of civilian support. The other key conditions are choice of target and 
events. If the enemy is usually, the national government with substantial 
events happening in home country then the other conditions like political 
competition, territory, and mainly nationalist/separatist ideology becomes 
highly relevant to explain the levels of civilian support. Another significant 
factor that is further revealed by the analysis is that nationalist/separatist 
ideology and not purely religious ideology is tied to higher civilian support. 
These findings have direct consequences for counter-terrorism. 
 
The existing public opinion surveys imply that only some of the major 
terrorist groups and their home countries have been included in these 
surveys. However, what is needed is a more comprehensive approach to locate 
and measure popular support for terrorist groups. This in itself should be part 
of the counter terrorism process. As the passive support from civilians in the 
terrorist home country is directly linked to the group’s survival and regular 
resource extraction, it is important to analyze how and in what capacity the 
civilians can be deterred from supporting these groups. If the terrorist groups 
relate the support to systematic punishment or provision of incentives then 
information should be culled from the people with specific details about the 
methods used by the terrorist groups. Often there is high public grievance 
against the state and existing government policies. In these cases, the national 
government must understand which areas of socio-economic and political 
development needs attention. These governments should also work 
extensively to decrease the lure of terrorist groups. The process of gauging 
civilian’s perception of terrorist group is the necessary first step in assessing 
the popularity of the group. This can be followed by elaborate programs to 
intercept the groups or their affiliates. Present counter terrorism policies 
include extensive military methods to repress terrorist groups. However, in 
areas where terrorists are in regular contact with the civilians, non-military 
methods should be introduced to make the appeal for terrorism less 
attractive. The first step of this non-military method should include an 
assessment of public attitudes towards the terrorist group.  
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Counter-terrorism policies are often designed based on the assumption that 
all terrorist groups operate using the same strategies. Comparing civilian 
support for terrorist groups reveals that terrorist-civilian interactions vary. 
This finding is especially relevant for counter-terrorism. Anti-terrorist 
policies are usually equated with deterrence. Governments all over the world 
have used strict anti-terrorism laws, repressive military measures, curtailing 
political, and human rights. These sorts of responses have largely ignored 
other possibilities, especially non-military methods to curb terrorism. For 
terrorist groups with high civilian support, non-military methods are 
essential. Using non-military methods will have a two-fold benefit. First, 
civilians will refrain from immediately criticizing government response. It 
might strategically help the government to reach out to the population. 
Second, it will end the cycle of violence by introducing peaceful ways of 
resolving conflict.  
 
High civilian support means that terrorist groups are deeply entrenched in 
the society. Additionally, my findings show that these groups have territorial 
control in the home country, are often active in electoral politics, are 
motivated by nationalist/separatist ideology, and usually have several 
affiliates. Since these groups are intrinsically linked with the socio-political 
scene, some non-military methods are possible options. These methods can 
be applied at two levels–one designed for civilians and the other for the 
terrorist groups. High civilian support for particular terrorist groups 
challenges the conventional military response to terrorism. The complex 
interactions between terrorist and civilians require programs that undermine 
the effectiveness or attractiveness of the terrorist groups. For example, to 
undermine the Red Brigades, a vigorous public education program in concert 
with an effective amnesty program (the pentiti program) was crucial in 
reducing public support for the Red Brigades.45 Atran suggests another line of 
defense that suggests appealing to Muslim communities to stop supporting 
religious schools and charities that fund terrorist networks.46 Frey and 
Luechinger suggest that positive incentives to abstain from violence are 
constructive and a  way that introduces non-violent alternative to address 
terrorist’s political agendas. These authors further suggest increasing incomes 
                                                          
45 Post, J. M., “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho‐ cultural Foundations of 
Contemporary Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26:4 (2005): 615-636. 
46 Atran, S., “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 65-
90. The education program framed the terrorists as murderers rather than cultural 
heroes. The terrorists were also seen as damaging the economy and hurting the entire 
society.  
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in peaceful occupations.47 Furthermore, since terrorist groups with territorial 
control have considerable access to constituent population, programs should 
be implemented to deprive terrorist outfits of territory that they use as safe 
havens.  
 
Methodologically, this analysis emphasizes the significance of the interactions 
between pre-existing/a priori conditions and acquired conditions, which 
constitutes the environment where the terrorist groups originate and 
continue their activities. Subsequently these interactions are responsible for 
high civilian support for these groups. In contrast to existing studies on 
terrorism and popular support that mentions the importance of resource 
provision, this study indicates another component, that is, resource extraction 
in the form of ideological support from the constituency. This reiterates the 
fact that terrorist groups are not altruistic but predatory in nature. In fact, 
resource prevision can be a necessary precondition for future resource 
extraction. The pre-existing and acquired conditions of the terrorist groups 
create a resource environment. The groups carefully assess this environment 
to include or exclude civilian support. When terrorist groups have clear aim of 
controlling territory it automatically leads them to interact with civilians. As 
this study shows, territorial control by terrorist groups in addition to their 
motives, targets, political aims, and networks with other organizations affects 
the levels of civilian support received by them. Therefore, it is important to 
delve deeper into the territorial bases of terrorism to see how ordinary 
civilians are impacted. My findings ultimately address the complicated issues 
present when intervening in communities where active terrorist groups are 
interacting regularly with civilian population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Frey, B. S., and S. Luechinger, “Three Strategies to Deal with Terrorism,” Economic 
Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy 27:2 (2008): 107-114. 
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Appendix i. Public Opinion Surveys for Terrorist Groups: Recording 
Popular Support for Terrorist Groups 
 
Groups Source Question Support for 
the Group 
Al Qa’eda World Public 
Opinion Poll 2006 
(Sample:2,089 
Afghan Adults 
View of Al’Qaeda’s 
influence in the world 
Positive 6% 
Negative 81% 
View of Osama Bin 
Laden 
Positive 5% 
Negative 90% 
Abu 
Sayaaf 
Group 
(ASG) 
Lexis Nexis Not Applicable Less than 5% 
CPI(M) Times of India Poll 
2010 
(521 Adults in 
central India) 
Whether the Maoists 
were good or bad for the 
region? 
60% - good 
CPN(M) Himal Media Public 
Opinion Poll 2003 
(1,667 respondents) 
If the Maoists laid down 
their arms and took part 
in elections today who 
would you vote for? 
21% (for 
Maoists) 
ETA Euskobarometer – 
Universidad del 
PaisVaseo 2009 
(1200 respondents) 
Question related to 
ETA- exact words of the 
question no known 
13% identified 
as former ETA 
sympathizers 
10% agreed 
with ETAs end 
3% justified 
support for 
ETA with 
criticism 
(Total support: 
13%) 
FARC Gallup Poll – 
FuerzasMilitares de 
cara al Siglo XXI 
(1998-2001) 
Exact question not 
known 
2% viewed the 
ELN and FARC 
favorably 
GIA Information on 
Armed Islamic 
Group – 
www.aph.gov.au 
Report – The GIA lost 
significant portion of its 
membership following 
defections to the GPSC 
and has only 30-100 
active members 
Less than 5% 
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Hamas Palestinian Center 
for Policy and 
Survey Research- 
Palestinian Public 
Opinion Poll No 
(46) 2012 (Sample: 
1270 Adults) 
Given the outcome of 
the war between 
Hamas/other 
resistance groups and 
Israel, in your view 
whose way is the best to 
end the Israel’s 
occupation and build a 
Palestinian state: 
Hamas’ way or 
Abbas’s? 
Certainly 
Hamas – 33% 
Hamas – 26% 
(Total: 59%) 
Hezbollah Pew Global 
Attitudes Survey 
2009-10 (Sample: 
1000 Muslim 
Adults) 
Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable 
or very unfavorable 
opinion of Hezbollah? 
31 % favorable 
10% somewhat 
favorable  
52% 
Appendix 1. continued. 
Groups Source  Question Support for 
the Group 
IRA Hewitt (1990) 
and Water and 
Fish 
1981 
 Percentage holding 
positive image of 
IRA in Northern 
Ireland (exact 
question not 
known) 
39% 
Lashkar-
e-Toiba 
(LeT) 
Pew Global 
Attitudes 
Survey 2012 
(1,206 Adults) 
 Please tell me if you 
have very 
favorable, 
somewhat 
favorable, 
somewhat 
unfavorable or very 
unfavorable 
opinion of Lashkar-
e-Toiba 
Very 
favorable + 
favorable = 
22% 
LTTE Mia Bloom 
(2004) 
Interview 
conducted in 
2002  
 Has the LTTE 
gained more now 
by using 
negotiations versus 
violence? 
No: 26% 
PKK SETA and 
Pollmark 
(2009) 
(10,577 
respondents in 
601 urban and 
ruralareas) 
 In your opinion, 
which of the below 
will be the most 
effective in the  
process of 
settlement of the 
Kurdish question? 
Both Turks 
and Kurds 
PKK 7.4% 
Among Kurds 
PKK 18.8% 
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 do you think, PKK’s 
giving up of arms 
and participation of 
its  
members in civil life 
would settle the 
Kurdish question? 
Both Turks 
and Kurds 
51.1% NO 
Among 
Kurds No 
50% 
 Do you think the 
neutralization of 
the PKK by the 
Turkish Military 
Forces would 
resolve the Kurdish 
question? 
Both Turks 
and Kurds 
55.6% NO 
Among Kurds 
No 75.3 % 
Shining 
Path 
Public Opinion 
Poll, Lima 1991 
in Harmon 
1992 
 People were asked 
about their reaction 
to a terrorist attack 
in connection to 
Shining Path? 
11% said they 
would 
understand 
it. 
 Support for 
Abimael Guzman? 
17%  within 
lower 
economic 
group  
Taliban World Public 
Opinion Poll 
2006, 
Afghanistan 
(Sample: 2089 
Adults) 
 If your opinion of 
Taliban is very 
favorable, 
favorable, 
unfavorable or very 
unfavorable? 
8% 
Table created by author based on the information provided in the 
table. 
Appendix ii. Location of Events, Target Selection and Ideology of the Terrorist 
Groups 
Group Years No. 
of 
inci
dent
s 
National: 
in home 
country 
Outside 
home 
country 
Target Ideology 
Abu Sayyaf 1994-2011 209 Philippines 
(100%) 
-- National Nationalist/Separatis
t +religious 
 
Al Q’aeda 1991-2011 79 Afghanistan 
(38%) 
Multiple 
locations 
(62%) 
 
International Religious 
CPI(M) 2005-2011 
 
1418 India 
(100%) 
 
-- National 
 
Communist/Socialist 
 
CPN(M) 1996-2008 
 
23 Nepal 
(100%) 
-- National Communist/Socialist 
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ETA 1970-2011 2027 Spain (97%) Multiple 
locations 
(3%) 
Mostly 
national 
Communist 
Socialist/Nationalist 
separatist 
 
FARC 1975-2011 2060 Colombia 
(99%) 
 
Other 1% National Communist Socialist 
GIA 1994-2006 239 Algeria 
(96%) 
Multiple 
locations 
(4%) 
Mostly 
national 
Religious 
 
Hamas 1988-2009 297 West Bank 
and Gaza 
strip (58%) 
Israel 
(41%) 
International Nationalist 
Separatist/religious 
 
Hezbollah 1982-2009 368 Lebanon 
(77%) 
Multiple 
locations 
(33%) 
 
Mostly 
national 
Nationalist 
Separatist/religious 
 
IRA 1970-2011 2673 Northern 
Ireland 
(88%) 
Great 
Britain 
and others 
(22%) 
international 
+ national 
Nationalist Separatist 
LTTE 1979-2010 1607 Sri Lanka 
(99%) 
 national Nationalist Separatist 
 
LeT 1999-2011 118 India India and 
others 
(1%) 
International Nationalist Separatist 
+religious 
       
PKK 1984-2011 1226 Turkey 
(86%) 
Multiple 
(14%) 
Mostly 
national 
Communist Socialist/ 
Nationalist separatist 
 
Shining 
Path 
1979-2009 4519 Peru (99%) Other (1%) National 
 
 
Communist Socialist 
Taliban 1995-2011 2045 Afghanistan 
(80%) 
Pakistan 
(20%) 
Mostly 
national 
Religious 
Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and 
TOPs and National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic 
fractionalization, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004) 
 
Appendix iii.  
 Territory 
in home 
country 
Political 
competition 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
in home country 
No. of 
Affiliates 
Abu 
Sayyaf 
 
Active in 
Mindanao, 
Sulu Island 
and Basilan – 
major 
presence  
 
Not active in 
electoral 
politics 
.161 
 
5 
 
Al Q’aeda Limited 
presence is 
Afghanistan-
Not active in 
electoral 
politics 
.751 36 
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spread 
across North 
Africa, 
Pakistan, 
Middle East, 
Southeast 
Asia 
 
CPI(M) Major 
presence in 
India 
Not active in 
electoral 
politics but 
some support 
from certain 
political 
parties 
 
.811 
 
10 
 
CPN(M) Major 
presence in 
Nepal 
Very active in 
electoral 
politics 
 
.677 
 
6 
 
ETA Primarily in 
Basque 
autonomous 
regions in 
Northern 
Spain and 
southwestern 
France 
 
Active link 
with political 
party Herri 
Batasuna 
 
.502 4 
FARC Major 
presence in 
Colombia 
Not active in 
electoral 
politics but 
links with 
Colombian 
Communist 
Party 
 
.656 
 
6 
 
GIA Mostly based 
in Algeria 
with limited 
presence 
outside 
 
Not active in 
electoral 
politics 
.32 5 
     
Hamas Major 
presence in 
West Bank 
and Gaza 
Strip 
 
Very active in 
electoral 
politics 
.526 10 
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Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and TOPs and 
National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic fractionalization, 
Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004) 
 
 
 
Hezbollah Major 
presence in 
Lebanon, 
southern 
part of 
Beirut, Bekka 
valley, some 
presence in 
Europe, 
Africa and 
South 
America 
Very active in 
electoral 
politics 
.78 8 
     
Appendix 
iii. 
continued. 
 
Group Territory in home 
country 
Political 
competition 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
in home country 
No. of 
Affiliates 
IRA Major presence in 
Northern Ireland with 
limited presence in Great 
Britain and Europe 
 
Linked with Sinn 
Fein 
.171 6 
LTTE Major presence in Sri 
Lanka 
Not active in 
electoral politics, 
some support from 
political parties 
.428 3 
     
     
PKK Present in Turkey but has 
base in Europe, Middle 
East and Asia 
 
Not active in 
electoral politics, 
some support from 
political parties  
 
.299 12 
Shining 
Path 
Major presence in rural 
Peru 
Not active in 
electoral politics 
 
.638 
 
2 
Taliban Major presence in 
Afghanistan and limited 
presence in Pakistan 
Mostly active in 
politics 
.751 4 
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